

## United Arab Emirates National Defense College

ABU DHABI, UAE

Course Number NDC 3009 National Security (3 credits)

Academic Year 2014-2015 Spring Term

> Course Coordinator: Dr. William Bradford

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Dr. John R. Ballard Dean National Defense College Major General Rashad M. Al Saadi Commandant National Defense College

## **Course Schedule**

Topic	Lecture + Syndicate, Panel, and/or Practicum 0830-1400	Topics	
1.	Sun, 26 APR	Introduction to National Security	
2.	Mon, 27 APR	Ebola Crisis Practicum: Part II, Day One	
3.	Tue, 28 APR	Ebola Crisis Practicum: Part II, Day Two	
4.	Wed, 29 APR	National Security, Law, and Military Force	
5.	Thu, 30 APR	Sports Day	
6.	Sun, 3 MAY	State Failure: Crisis Case Study Yemen and Group Prep	
7.	Mon, 4 MAY	Yemen Crisis Practicum Day One	
8.	Tue, 5 MAY	Yemen Crisis Practicum Day Two	
9.	Wed, 6 MAY	Yemen Crisis Practicum Day Three	
10.	Thu, 7 MAY	DLP from UAE National Security Council	
11.	Sun, 10 MAY	ISIS Panel and Group Prep	
12.	Mon, 11 MAY	ISIS Crisis Practicum Day One	
13.	Tue, 12 MAY	ISIS Crisis Practicum Day Two	

14.	Wed, 13 MAY	ISIS Crisis Practicum Day Three	
15.	Thu, 14 MAY	ISIS Crisis Practicum Day Four	

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#### **Faculty**

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## **Dr. Sterling Jensen**

Assistant Professor, Strategy and Security Studies, and ISIS Crisis Practicum Faculty Lead

Dr. Saleh Maita, Ebola Practicum Faculty Lead

Prof. Bob Sharp, Yemen Practicum Faculty Lead

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**Prof. Nathan Toronto**, Control Team and Practicum Economic Advisor

**Prof. Rob Stewart-Ingersoll**, Control Team and Practicum Foreign Affairs Advisor

**Prof. Reem Abu Lughod**, Control Team and Practicum Domestic/Interior Advisor

**Prof. Gerard Hall**, Control Team and Practicum Media and Whole of Government Advisor

## **College Introduction**

National Defense College is a leading institute that contributes to the development of strategic thinking and planning which promotes the conduct of strategic and security studies at national, regional and international levels. It prepares and qualifies both military and civilian leaders and improves their skills in identifying and assessing challenges to national, regional and international security. In addition, participants develop an understanding of the fundamentals and requirements for managing and employing state resources in order to defend national interests. After completing this program, participants should be able to:

- 1. Think critically and strategically in applying practical knowledge collaboratively and in complex circumstances with diverse partners;
- 2. Analyze how domestic, regional and international factors shape strategy and evaluate strategic environments and their impact on national security at the national, regional and international levels;
- 3. Evaluate strategic threats and opportunities to facilitate national security decision-making;
- 4. Produce frameworks for formulating a comprehensive national security strategy;
- 5. Coordinate the use of national resources in national security crises;
- 6. Evaluate the relationship between political outcomes, strategy, and the use of instruments of national power (e.g. diplomacy, military, economic and information) to resource national security strategy in peace, crisis and war; and
- 7. Serve as strategic leaders who can effectively shape and implement policy and develop appropriate strategies in support of national security outcomes.

#### **Course Introduction**

This course examines: (1) the general concepts and definition of national security, themes and issues relevant to strategic policy- and decision-making and (2) the comparative dimensions of national security and strategy. The course draws all other courses and themes across the College program of study together to provide opportunity for participants to demonstrate the knowledge gained at NDC through three, sequential, challenging national security practicums over a total of eleven days.

The course will set conditions for healthy debate about the definition of national security by providing a brief introduction to national security decision making architecture in general and specifically for the UAE. The elements/components of strategy – ends, ways and means – are reviewed and through three relevant national security practicums participants demonstrate their knowledge.

Upon successful completion of this course, participants will be able to:

- **Think** critically and strategically in order to apply practical knowledge in collaborative ways and in complex circumstances with diverse partners;
- **Analyze** how domestic, regional and international factors shape strategy and be able to evaluate strategic environments and their impact on national security at the national, regional and international levels;
- **Produce** frameworks for formulating either specialized strategies (diplomatic/military/economic/informational) for a national comprehensive strategy;
- **Evaluate** the relationship between political outcomes, strategy, and the use of instruments of national power (e.g. diplomacy, military, economic and information) to resource strategy in peace, crisis and war; and
- Evaluate strategic threats and challenges in order to facilitate national security decision-making.
- **Understand** in breadth the national security strategy development process to facilitate decision-making.
- **Serve** as strategic leaders who can effectively shape and implement policy and develop appropriate strategies in support of national security outcomes.

#### **Course Requirements**

The required readings listed for each topic should be read before the seminar meets. The faculty has selected the readings for their relevance, quality of ideas, readability, and timeliness. Generally, these readings are listed in an order reflecting the logical development of the topic and can be most profitably read in that order. Additional Resources (when listed) are offered for background reference and for those who might wish to pursue a particular topic in greater depth, but they are neither required nor reprinted. Participants will not be tested on the material under "Additional Resources."

Please note that the day may run from 0800 to 1400 to permit completion of all assigned material and tasks, in particular the three practicums.

The specific graded elements of the course are:

- National Security Practicums: Participants' individual preparation for and participation in three national security practicums, including their briefings, will constitute 80% of the final grade. Negotiation skills, consensus-building, facilitation of decisions, and other aspects of strategic leadership will factor into a holistic evaluation of each student's performance.
- Class Attendance, Seminar Contribution, and Role Preparation/Reaction Papers: Participants are expected to attend class, read the assigned readings, contribute to Blackboard discussions and be prepared for discussions. Contribution will be measured based on the student's grasp of the reading materials and lectures as demonstrated during question and answer periods and the contribution made to learning in seminar and during preparation of the end of course brief. Attendance and contribution, a role preparation assignment, and a lessons-learned assignment, constitute 20% of the final course grade.

The final grade for the course will be computed with the following weights:

National Security Practicums : 80% Seminar and Blackboard Participation: 20%

Individual Assignment Grade	Grade Points	Criteria	Course / Program Overall Assessment Grade
A	4.0	Commendable command of information; high level of analytical development Exceeds Standards - A	
В	3.0	Excellent command of information; advanced analytical development	Meets Standards - B
С	Command of only basi 2.0 concepts; evidence of minimal analysis		Below Standards - C
F	0.0	Insufficient demonstration of basic concepts of analysis	Failure - F
I	0.0	Not complete due to reasons outside his / her control	Incomplete - I

#### **Course Materials and Syndicate Assignments**

Readings will be posted for participants on Blackboard.

## **Introduction to National Security**

Topic 1 examines the theoretical and conceptual basis of the term "national security" to clarify what we mean when we use it and enable more precision in discussing and selecting ends, ways, and means in practice.

Furthermore, because national security decision making is usually a complex process managed through bureaucratic architecture and predicated upon uncertainty. Topic I examines national security bureaucratic architecture—generally and from an Emirati perspective—along with sources of decisional failure to better enable more effective national security strategy and decision making. In doing so, Topic I examines whether national security as a concept may be culturally bound, or at the very least informed by values, interests, and norms that arise from and are rooted deeply in the culture of peoples.

Participants will conduct an practicum whereby they will be assigned to practicum UAE ministries. They will be provided additional briefing materials, background information, a current situation, a crisis scenario, and a tasking. Participants will then gather in their assigned teams to begin preparation for the Ebola Crisis Practicum in Topics 2, 3, and 4.

## Learning Outcomes:

- 1. Analyze the indeterminate nature of the phrase "national security" and the relationship between definition(s) of national security and its relationship to the ends, ways, and means which follow from definitional choices.
- 2. Evaluate the causes of national security decision failure and locate their roots in the national security decision making architecture, in cognitive biases, and in specific decisional contexts.
- 3. Evaluate Emirati and non-Emirati exemplars.
- 4. Analyze the cultural antecedents of the concept national security within a given political system.

#### **Discussion Questions:**

- 1. What is national security, and how is it re/defined, quantified, and measured?
- 2. What is the process whereby national security strategy is made, and what are the determinants of national security strategy?
- 3. Is the national security strategy of a country determined by the intersection of its interests and its available instruments of national power? Or is it conditioned by other variables, such as culture, ideology, history, religion, and other factors difficult to incorporate within the Deibel framework? What about the UAE?
- 4. What important issues, considerations, and caveats should guide decision-makers and strategists in the national security policy- and decision-making processes, both in times of relative stability and in times of crisis?
- 5. What bureaucratic architecture best supports effective national security decision making, generally and here in the UAE?

#### Exercise:

## Required Readings:

- Baldwin, David. "The Concept of Security," in *Security Studies: A Reader* (Christopher W. Hughes & Lai Yew Meng eds. 2011), 24-32.
- Lebovic, James. "National Security through a Cockeyed Lens: How Cognitive Bias Influences U.S. Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 129, No. 3 (2014): 534-536.
- Schwenk, Charles W. "Cognitive Simplification Processes in Strategic Decision Making." *Strategic Management Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1984).
- Mitchell, David, and Massoud, Tansa George. "Anatomy of Failure: Bush's Decision-Making Process and the Iraq War." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 5 (2009): 265-286. Carter, Ashton B. *The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism*, MIT Press, 2006: 1-20.

## Supplemental Readings

- Desch, Michael C. "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies." International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1998): 141-170.
- Kerbel, Josh. "Thinking Straight: Cognitive Bias in the U.S. Debate About China." At <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no3/article03.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no3/article03.html</a>
- Khorany, Baghat. *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World* (1993): Introduction.

## **Ebola Crisis: Part II, Day One**

Topic 2 is a continuation of a regional crisis practicum that seeks to put all the theory and seminar experience of the course into a practicum of a real-world national security problem.

The crisis practicum is driven by a scenario, issued previously along with background and briefing materials to participants, involving exploitation of an Ebola virus outbreak to sow fear and disruption and damage the regional political economy. Over the course of two days, participants will apply the substantive knowledge gained thus far throughout the year in the process of making recommendations regarding courses of action in response to a "real-world" crisis

Specifically, participants will be assigned roles as part of a multi-ministry UAE team that will, in response to the unfolding crisis, be required to produce and amend recommendation as to a regional and national security strategy generally and courses of action specifically designed to guide the GCC Secretary General and the UAE Ambassador to the GCC.

Participants will brainstorm ends, ways and means utilizing all UAE instruments of national power, and in so doing will represent and pursue the interests of their ministry as well as those of the UAE.

Recommendations as to national security strategy and courses of action will draw upon the Deibel format and incorporate considerations of relevant domestic and international actors and assumptions, interests, structures, resources, available instruments of power, and ends, ways, and means. As the outcome of this practicum, the class will draft and brief a strategy and respond to questions.

Throughout, faculty will provide input to support the practicum, including by representation of the interests of relevant GCC nations, the GCC itself, the UN, and important regional and international actors. Announcements as to important events—statements, decisions, actions, discussions, agreements—will be issued intermittently via email. Faculty will goad action and events as necessary to maintain realism and tension and to guide participants in the representation of the ends of their ministries and the UAE.

On the two days of the crisis practicum, participants will be provided information that will escalate the crisis, prompt re-evaluation of the utility and effectiveness of previously advocated courses of action, and require reconsideration and adjustment of these courses of action to better link ends with means to secure ministerial and UAE national interests.

Daily injects of additional information will change the narrative, demand a re-think and derivation of critical thinking and the fusion of course-taught themes and content to practical application.

Participants will assemble in the basement auditorium, which will function as an operations center complete with maps and other materials to provide situational awareness, for the duration of the practicum.

## Learning Outcomes:

- 1. **Think** critically and strategically in order to apply practical knowledge in collaborative ways and in complex circumstances with diverse partners;
- 2. **Analyze** how domestic, regional and international factors shape strategy and be able to evaluate strategic environments and their impact on national security at the national, regional and international levels;
- 3. **Produce** frameworks for formulating either specialized strategies (diplomatic/military/economic/informational) for a national comprehensive strategy;
- 4. **Evaluate** the relationship between political outcomes, strategy, and the use of instruments of national power (e.g. diplomacy, military, economic and information) to resource strategy in peace, crisis and war; and
- 5. **Evaluate** strategic threats and challenges in order to facilitate national security decision-making.
- 6. **Serve** as strategic leaders who can effectively shape and implement policy and develop appropriate strategies in support of national security outcomes.

Req	uired	Read	lings:

None.

# Ebola Crisis Part II, Day Two: Decision Briefing, Lessons Learned, Reflection, Discussion, Wrap-Up

In Topic 3, the class will brief its strategy, complete with recommended course(s) of action. Participants will justify and defend recommended courses of action against critical questioning, explain courses of action not recommended and why, evaluate opposing strategies and courses of action, and identify gaps in available information, flawed assumptions, and any other sources of uncertainty or potential decision failure that might mitigate confidence in their recommendations.

Finally, participants will have the opportunity to derive lessons learned, advise as to course improvements, and otherwise offer feedback as to Week One.

## Assignment:

- 1. Create and brief recommended courses of action in response to a simulated national security crisis, referencing the Deibel format.
- 2. Justify and defend recommended courses of action in response to critical questioning and differences of opinion.
- 3. Explain courses of action not recommended.
- 4. Evaluate opposing strategies and courses of action.
- 5. Identify gaps in information, flawed assumptions, and any other sources of uncertainty or potential decision failure.

## Learning Outcomes:

- 1. **Think** critically and strategically in order to apply practical knowledge in collaborative ways and in complex circumstances with diverse partners;
- 2. **Analyze** how domestic, regional and international factors shape strategy and be able to evaluate strategic environments and their impact on national security at the national, regional and international levels;
- 3. **Produce** frameworks for formulating either specialized strategies (diplomatic/military/economic/informational) for a national comprehensive strategy;
- 4. **Evaluate** the relationship between political outcomes, strategy, and the use of instruments of national power (e.g. diplomacy, military, economic and information) to resource strategy in peace, crisis and war; and
- 5. **Evaluate** strategic threats and challenges in order to facilitate national security decision-making.
- 6. **Serve** as strategic leaders who can effectively shape and implement policy and develop appropriate strategies in support of national security outcomes.

#### **Discussion Questions:**

• What did you learn about yourself and others? Did it validate or not your Strategic Leadership Personal Action Plan?

- How does the practicum link to your Strategic Leadership course?
- What were the three most remarkable moments in the practicum? What did you derive from the practicum that is of enduring value, either in terms of substance or procedure?
- Was there an optimal solution to the problem presented? If so, what kept you from achieving it? What would you do differently if you had to repeat the practicum?
- What mechanism(s) for improvement of the process whereby decisions were reached, or of the decisions themselves, can you create based on the lessons learned in this practicum?
- In general, where are the problems and the gaps in capacity, coordination, information, and otherwise?
- What would you tell next year's class to do or not do if they were to perform this practicum?

## **Required Readings:**

- Guidelines for Writing a Lessons Learned Report.
   <a href="http://www.orau.gov/cdcynergy/soc2web/Content/phase06/phase06\_step-3">http://www.orau.gov/cdcynergy/soc2web/Content/phase06/phase06\_step-3</a> deeper lessons learned.htm
- Burns, Shawn W. "War Gaming as Reflective Practice." United States Naval War College (2010).

## **International Law, Military Force, and National Security**

Strategists charged with the promotion and protection of national security must on occasion consider the use of military force against other states or violent nonstate actors. Potential applications of military force can range along a conflict spectrum from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations all the way to conventional high-intensity combat as was discussed during the Defense Components course. International law, which consists of customs, treaties, judicial decisions, and other sources, governs every aspect of the use of the military instrument of power, from the initial decision to resort to military force in international relations to the conduct of subsequent armed conflict, the cessation of hostilities, and the negotiation and preservation of of peace and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization.

Topic 4 introduces the international law applicable to the use of military power in national security strategy, including the resort to force in international relations, individual self-defense and collective security by regional organizations, counterterrorism, humanitarian intervention, and peace and post-conflict stabilization operations. It then discusses thorny issues involving the application, interpretation, and justification of international law and decisions about international law that may and likely will confront national strategists as they address complex problems involving the use of force in support of national security in coming years.

Relevant sources of international law, including the UN Charter generally and Chapters VI and VII in particular, which form the core of the regime governing the use of force in international relations and the creation and maintenance of peace will be examined in detail in applications relevant to national security strategists and decisionmakers.

#### Learning Outcomes:

- 1. Understand the international legal framework governing the use of force to promote and protect national security.
- 2. Analyze issues involving the application, interpretation, and justification of international law that will involve UAE national strategists as they address complex problems involving the use of force in support of national security in coming years.
- 3. Create a template to guide UAE national strategists in complying with international law as they address future issues implicating the use of force in international relations.

#### Practical Exercise:

• Break into two groups. For the first thirty minutes, brainstorm answers to the following questions: (a) What are the most likely applications of UAE military force in the next decade? (b) How will that force be applied—unilaterally, in regional organizations, or under UN auspices? (c) What international law applies to each likely use of force? (d) What arguments should UAE strategists be prepared to make regarding the legality of these uses of force? (e) Is existing international law adequate to the security requirements of the UAE? If not, what changes should be made? As you form your answers, consider issues such as intervention in a failed or failing state such as Yemen.

or an international effort to counter Da'esh/ISIS. Each group will then present a 7 minute brief to the syndicate.

## Required Readings:

- Bradford, William. Excerpt from "The Duty to Defend Them: A Natural Legal Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War," *Notre Dame Law Journal*, Vol. 79 (2003): 1-10.
- Moore, John Norton, and Turner, Robert F. National Security Law (2007): 69-72, 86-89, 94-95, 120-138, 199-200, 213-217, 220-221, 230, 232-239, 243-246, 249-59, 276-78, 281-89, 291-296, 305-314

## **Supplemental Readings**:

- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008): 1-31.
- Williams, Robert E., Jr., and Caldwell, Dan. "Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of A Just Peace." *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (November 2006): 309-320
- Carter & Trimble: 977-81, 998-1001, 1004-1005, 1013-1014, 1023-1026

#### **State Failure and Yemen Panel**

"America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones."

— US National Security Strategy, 2002

Failing and collapsed states were frequently seen as a peripheral issues in a global security environment dominated by great power conflict. After the Cold War, however, both the policy and academic communities have increasingly given such states more attention. Both the security implications of state failure, due to the possibility of links between failed states and violent non-state actors and transnational crime as well as the humanitarian implications, including famine, forced migration, and other consequences have received considerable attention. This has led to a debate about how state failure can be prevented or mitigated.

Yet our understandings of when a state is weak or failing and the policy implications of state weakness are in question. Scholars and practitioners have argued that labeling a state as weak or failed is frequently capricious or unclear and further charged that the relationship between state failure and terrorism and organized crime is unsubstantiated.

When states lose effective control over their borders and can no longer ensure their populations the basic necessities of life, or are otherwise unwilling to enforce the rule of domestic and international law, they become fertile soil for radicalization, havens for terrorists, and promoters of international instability. Bad governance or, worse, outright violence perpetrated by states against some parts of their own populations or against the populations of their neighbors in the name of ethnicity, religion, or ideology creates humanitarian disasters and national security challenges as states and the international community are compelled to consider costly and risky responses, including humanitarian intervention and peace operations.

Following lecture, a panel of subject matter experts will discuss the historical background and contemporary situation regarding the ongoing crisis in the failing state of Yemen to prepare participants for participation in a Yemen Crisis Practicum. On the conclusion of the panel, participants will gather in their teams to review the briefing materials and begin preparation for the Yemen Crisis Practicum.

## <u>Learning Outcomes:</u>

- 1. Understand the mainstream definition of weak, failing, and collapsed states and some common objections to the concept and its application.
- 2. Evaluate common arguments about the root causes and paths of state failure.
- 3. Understand the causal relationship between bad governance on the one hand and state failure on the other.
- 4. Critically analyze the causes of and responses to state fragility in current examples of weak, failing, and failed states.
- 5. Evaluate the international context to identify potential state failures, including Yemen, that may challenge UAE national security strategists.

## **Discussion Questions:**

- What makes a failing or collapsed state? Why do some weak states collapse while others endure?
- Is the concept of state weakness, failure, and collapse useful for strategists?
- How do the characteristics of post-Cold War intrastate conflicts affect the way the international community might intervene in a failing state?

## Required Readings:

- Goldstone, Jack. "Pathways to State Failure" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25 (2008): 85-96.
- Easterly, William and Laura Freschi. "Top 5 Reasons Why "Failed State" is a Failed Concept." Aidwatchers.com/2010/01/top-5-reasons-why-"failed-state"-is-a-failed-concept/
- Herbst, Jeffrey, "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice" in Robert Rotberg ed. *When States Fail* (2004): 303-318.
- Weiss, Matthew I. "A Perfect Storm: The Causes and Consequences of Severe Water Scarcity, Institutional Breakdown and Conflict in Yemen." *Water International*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2015): 251-272.
- Scan Foreign Policy's Fragile State Index (<a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/">http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/</a>).
- Yemen Crisis Practicum Packet.

## Assignment:

Upload to Blackboard a 500-word statement describing what you identify as the central tasks of your role in the upcoming Yemen Crisis Practicum, what you anticipate the obstacles to achieving those tasks to be, and with whom you will ally, what resources you will employ, and how you will employ them to achieve ministerial and national outcomes. In addition, review the role statements of ministerial colleagues from your own and other ministries.

## **Topics 7 & 8**

## **Yemen Crisis Practicum Days One and Two**

Over the course of two days, participants will apply the substantive knowledge gained throughout the year in a national security crisis action practicum. It will require them to make recommendations regarding courses of action the UAE should take as part of a GCC mission to Yemen.

Participants will be assigned roles as military and civil officials working as a team across the whole of the UAE government and interacting strategically with other global and regional powers, subnational actors/insurgent organizations, international organizations, NGOs, media, and civil society—all of which will be represented by a Control Team consisting of faculty, staff, and other experts—in an environment characterized by stress and short decisional time.

Participants will be provided additional instructions and briefing materials on the Yemen Crisis, to include a political overview of the origins of the Crisis and the positions of the important actors, an economic and social overview, additional background information, a current situation, a crisis scenario, and a tasking.

Once gathered in their teams, participants will commence the Yemen Crisis Practicum, drawing upon the Deibel format and incorporating considerations of relevant domestic and international actors and assumptions, interests, structures, resources, available instruments of power, and ends, ways, and means to craft ministerial and national strategies.

As the outcome of the practicum, participants will draft and brief a set of recommended strategic options for a whole-of-government response to the tasking. A lessons learned discussion will follow.

The practicum will proceed in three phases per day as follows:

- (A) Information/Intelligence Distribution Phase: at the beginning of each day, participants will receive a brief summation of any relevant information subsequent to the previous day's action.
- (B) Ministerial Strategy Phase: participants will assess the crisis in light of all available information and decide, within their own ministries, which issues need to be subjected to strategic analysis and which strategic options should be developed and discussed in the National Strategy and Action Phase to achieve national outcomes.
- (C) National Strategy and Action Phase: at the direction of the head of state, representative of ministries will convene together in plenary session to (a) achieve national consensus on strategy, (b) further develop and discuss tentative strategic options, (c) make recommendation(s) as to the selection and briefing of any strategic options, and (d) task ministries with additional requirements in support of national strategy and action.

As events unfold and new information is developed through the two days of the practicum, participants will modify, amend, and further articulate their ministerial and national agendas, policies, and strategies. Throughout, the Control Team will provide administrative and logistical control and substantive input to motivate the practicum, including by

representation of the interests and views of permanent members of the UNSC, other relevant nations, the UN General Assembly, NGOs, the media, and other important domestic, regional and international actors. Announcements as to important events—statements, decisions, actions, discussions, agreements—will be issued intermittently via email. The Control Team will goad action and events as necessary to maintain realism and tension to guide participants in developing their issues, policies, and strategies.

## Learning Outcomes:

- 1. **Think** critically and strategically in order to apply practical knowledge in collaborative ways and in complex circumstances with diverse partners;
- 2. **Analyze** how domestic, regional and international factors shape strategy and be able to evaluate strategic environments and their impact on national security at the national, regional and international levels;
- 3. **Produce** frameworks for formulating either specialized strategies (diplomatic/military/economic/informational) for a national comprehensive strategy;
- 4. **Evaluate** the relationship between political outcomes, strategy, and the use of instruments of national power (e.g. diplomacy, military, economic and information) to resource strategy in peace, crisis and war; and
- 5. **Evaluate** strategic threats and challenges in order to facilitate national security decision-making.
- 6. **Serve** as strategic leaders who can effectively shape and implement policy and develop appropriate strategies in support of national security outcomes.

## Required Readings:

Yemen Practicum Packet

# Yemen Crisis Practicum Day Three: Decision Briefing, Lessons Learned, Reflection, Discussion, Wrap-Up

In Topic 9, the class will brief to the NDC its Yemen strategy, complete with recommended strategic options and courses of action. Participants will justify and defend recommended options and courses of action against critical questioning, explain options courses of action not recommended and why, evaluate opposing strategies and courses of action, and identify gaps in available information, flawed assumptions, and any other sources of uncertainty or potential decision failure that might mitigate confidence in their recommendations.

Finally, participants will have the opportunity to derive lessons learned, advise as to course improvements, and otherwise offer feedback as to Week Two.

## Assignment:

- 1. Create and brief recommended courses of action in response to a simulated national security crisis, referencing the Deibel format
- 2. Justify and defend recommended courses of action in response to critical questioning and differences of opinion.
- 3. Explain courses of action not recommended.
- 4. Evaluate opposing strategies and courses of action.
- 5. Identify gaps in information, flawed assumptions, and any other sources of uncertainty or potential decision failure.

#### Discussion Questions:

- What did you learn about yourself and others? Did it validate or not your Strategic Leadership Personal Action Plan?
- How does the practicum link to your Strategic Leadership course?
- What were the three most remarkable moments in the practicum? What did you derive from the practicum that is of enduring value, either in terms of substance or procedure?
- Was there an optimal solution to the problem presented? If so, what kept you from achieving it? What would you do differently if you had to repeat the practicum?
- What mechanism(s) for improvement of the process whereby decisions were reached, or of the decisions themselves, can you create based on the lessons learned in this practicum?
- In general, where are the problems and the gaps in capacity, coordination, information, and otherwise?
- What would you tell next year's class to do or not do if they were to perform this practicum?

## Required Readings:

- Guidelines for Writing a Lessons Learned Report.
   <a href="http://www.orau.gov/cdcynergy/soc2web/Content/phase06/phase06\_step-3\_deeper\_lessons\_learned.htm">http://www.orau.gov/cdcynergy/soc2web/Content/phase06/phase06\_step-3\_deeper\_lessons\_learned.htm</a>
- Burns, Shawn W. "War Gaming as Reflective Practice." United States Naval War College (2010).

## **DLP from UAE National Security Council**

Brigadier General al Arian from the UAE National Security Council

Potential subjects: (a) UAE National Security Strategy on Yemen and/or on ISIS, (b) UAE National Security Decisionmaking: Best Practices and Lessons Learned, (c) UAE National Security Cooperation with GCC, NATO, and the UN in previous Chapter VI/Chapter VII Missions

-participants will ask questions relevant to what they have learned from Ebola and Yemen relating to UAE NSS process

## ISIS Panel and ISIS Crisis Scenario Release/Group Study

Topic 11 commences with an ISIS Panel of subject matter experts discussing the historical background and contemporary situation regarding the ongoing crisis regarding the violent nonstate actor ISIS (or Da'esh) to prepare participants for participation in an ISIS Crisis Practicum. Over the course of four days, participants will apply the substantive knowledge gained throughout the year in a national security crisis action practicum that will require them to make recommendations regarding courses of action the UAE should take in regard to a potential UN-sponsored, Arab- and/or NATO-led operation to solve the problem(s) posed by ISIS, with specific operational consideration as to whether, how, and by what means to engage militarily with ISIS and to what ends, how to create and implement a formal peace agreement, how to provide security to civilian agencies establishing institutions of governance, humanitarian relief and refugee operations, facilitating Syrian and Iraqi national reconstruction and stabilization, and other tasks incident to ending the threat to the UAE and the international community posed by ISIS.

Following the ISIS Panel, participants will receive an ISIS Crisis Practicum Packet that will provide additional instructions and briefing materials on the ISIS Crisis, to include a political overview of the origins of the Crisis and the positions of the important actors, an economic and social overview, additional background information, a current situation, a crisis scenario, and a tasking. Participants will gather in their teams to continue preparation for the ISIS Crisis Practicum.

## Required Readings:

- Ross, Harrison. "Towards a Regional Strategy Contra ISIS." *Parameters*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Autumn 2014).
- ISIS Crisis Practicum Packet.

#### **Topics 12-14**

## ISIS Crisis Practicum: Days One, Two, and Three

Over the course of four days, participants will apply the substantive knowledge gained throughout the year in a national security crisis action practicum that will require them to make recommendations regarding courses of action the UAE should take in regard to a potential UN-sponsored, Arab- and/or NATO-led operation to solve the problem(s) posed by ISIS, with specific operational consideration as to whether, how, and by what means to engage militarily with ISIS and to what ends, how to create and implement a formal peace agreement, how to provide security to civilian agencies establishing institutions of governance, humanitarian relief and refugee operations, facilitating Syrian and Iraqi national reconstruction and stabilization, and other tasks incident to ending the threat to the UAE and the international community posed by ISIS.

Participants will be assigned roles as military and civil officials working as a team across the whole of the UAE government and interacting strategically with other global and regional powers, subnational actors/insurgent organizations, international organizations, NGOs, media, and civil society—all of which will be represented by a Control Team consisting of faculty, staff, and other experts—in an environment characterized by stress and short decisional time. Participants will draw upon the Deibel format and incorporating considerations of relevant domestic and international actors and assumptions, interests, structures, resources, available instruments of power, and ends, ways, and means to craft ministerial and national strategies.

As the outcome of the practicum, participants will draft and brief a set of recommended strategic options for a whole-of-government response to the tasking. A lessons learned discussion will follow.

The practicum will proceed in three phases per day as follows:

- (A) Information/Intelligence Distribution Phase: at the beginning of each day, participants will receive a brief summation of any relevant information subsequent to the previous day's action.
- (B) Ministerial Strategy Phase: participants will assess the crisis in light of all available information and decide, within their own ministries, which issues need to be subjected to strategic analysis and which strategic options should be developed and discussed in the National Strategy and Action Phase to achieve national outcomes.
- (C) National Strategy and Action Phase: at the direction of the head of state, representative of ministries will convene together in plenary session to (a) achieve national consensus on strategy, (b) further develop and discuss tentative strategic options, (c) make recommendation(s) as to the selection and briefing of any strategic options, and (d) task ministries with additional requirements in support of national strategy and action.

As events unfold and new information is developed through the five days of the practicum, participants will modify, amend, and further articulate their ministerial and national agendas, policies, and strategies. Throughout, the Control Team will provide administrative

and logistical control and substantive input to motivate the practicum, including by representation of the interests and views of permanent members of the UNSC, other relevant nations, the UN General Assembly, NGOs, the media, and other important domestic, regional and international actors. Announcements as to important events—statements, decisions, actions, discussions, agreements—will be issued intermittently via email. The Control Team will goad action and events as necessary to maintain realism and tension to guide participants in developing their issues, policies, and strategies.

## <u>Learning Outcomes</u>:

- 1. **Think** critically and strategically in order to apply practical knowledge in collaborative ways and in complex circumstances with diverse partners;
- 2. **Analyze** how domestic, regional and international factors shape strategy and be able to evaluate strategic environments and their impact on national security at the national, regional and international levels;
- 3. **Produce** frameworks for formulating either specialized strategies (diplomatic/military/economic/informational) for a national comprehensive strategy;
- 4. **Evaluate** the relationship between political outcomes, strategy, and the use of instruments of national power (e.g. diplomacy, military, economic and information) to resource strategy in peace, crisis and war; and
- 5. **Evaluate** strategic threats and challenges in order to facilitate national security decision-making.
- 6. **Serve** as strategic leaders who can effectively shape and implement policy and develop appropriate strategies in support of national security outcomes.

## Required Readings:

None.

# ISIS Crisis Practicum Day Four: Conclusion, Briefing, Lessons Learned, Reflection, Discussion, and Wrap-Up

In Topic 15, the class will brief its action-agenda and its strategy, complete with recommended strategic options and coordinating instructions. Participants will justify and defend recommended options and courses of action against critical questioning, explain courses of action not recommended and why, evaluate opposing strategies and courses of action, and identify gaps in available information, flawed assumptions, and any other sources of uncertainty or potential decision failure that might mitigate confidence in their recommendations.

Finally, participants will have the opportunity to derive lessons learned, advise as to course improvements, and otherwise offer feedback as to Week Three.

#### Exercise:

- 1. Identify and prioritize strategic options the UAE should implement in regard to a potential UAE contribution to an international mission against ISIS.
- 2. Analyze the existing UAE national security strategy to determine whether it identifies threats and opportunities with respect to Chapter VI and Chapter VII missions and whether it connects national ends to available instruments of power, and to the resources necessary to create those instruments, in specific ways to advance UAE interests in the mission against ISIS.
- 3. Analyze how the existing UAE national security strategy should be amended in light of lessons learned in the practicum.
- 4. Create a template of essential tasks, timelines, and material and personnel to be used to identify and coordinate operations across the whole of government in future Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations
- 5.

#### Discussion Questions:

- 1. What did you learn about yourself and others? Did it validate or not your Strategic Leadership Personal Action Plan?
- 2. How does the practicum link to your Strategic Leadership course?
- 3. What were the three most remarkable moments in the practicum? What did you derive from the practicum that is of enduring value, either in terms of substance or procedure?
- 4. Was there an optimal solution to the problem presented? If so, what kept you from achieving it? What would you do differently if you had to repeat the practicum?
- 5. What mechanism(s) for improvement of the process whereby decisions were reached, or of the decisions themselves, can you create based on the lessons learned in this practicum?
- 6. In general, where are the problems and the gaps in capacity, coordination, information, and otherwise?
- 7. What would you tell next year's class to do or not do if they were to perform this practicum?

## Required Readings:

- Guidelines for Writing a Lessons Learned Report.
   <a href="http://www.orau.gov/cdcynergy/soc2web/Content/phase06/phase06\_step-3">http://www.orau.gov/cdcynergy/soc2web/Content/phase06/phase06\_step-3</a> deeper lessons learned.htm
- Burns, Shawn W. "War Gaming as Reflective Practice." United States Naval War College (2010).

## Assignment:

Following the conclusion of the ISIS Crisis Practicum, upload to Blackboard a 750-word reaction paper in which you assess to what extent you were able to achieve ministerial and national outcomes. Identify what you did in the practicum that you would do again and what you would do differently if you were to repeat it, in terms of the selection of strategic options. Also, identify what interministerial coordination mechanisms need improvement to facilitate national response, along with any problems and gaps in capacity, coordination, and information. Finally, specify any template you might use to guide future decisionmaking in a similar crisis.